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Earnings Management Priorities of Private Family Firms 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We compare earnings management priorities of private family and private non-family firms. 
Our study is made possible by the availability of a new and unique database on family 
relationships between CEOs, board members and owners of private Norwegian firms. We 
hypothesize and find that compared with private non-family firms, private family firms are 
likely to manage earnings downward. However, we also find that highly leveraged private 
family firms make more income increasing accounting choices than highly leveraged private 
non-family firms. Finally, we document that CEOs representing controlling families promote 
earnings management, and independent board members somewhat mitigate it. We note that 
research on the relationship between financial reporting quality and family governance is 
quite limited. We contribute to this emerging literature.   
 
 
Key words: Earnings management, family and non-family private firms 
Data Availability: The data used in this study is a property of the Center for Corporate 
Governance Research at the Norwegian School of Management 
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1. Introduction 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to investigate differences in earnings 
management (EM) between private family firms and private non-family firms. We adopt 
Healy and Wahlen’s (1999; 368) definition of EM as follows: 
Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and 
in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers. 
 
 
We argue that private firms’ motivations to manage earnings are different from those 
of public companies, and that family firms’ motivations are different from non-family firms’ 
motivations. For example, while capital markets may be a key determinant of EM by public 
firms, capital markets effect on EM is negligible in private firms. Instead, the salient factor 
influencing EM in private family firms is the relationship between the controlling family and 
other stakeholders. The controlling family may be motivated to conceal the true financial 
performance of the firm to outsiders, and manage earnings with the objective of reducing 
reported income. Under financial stress, however, the priority of family firms may shift to 
defending continued family control. We expect that the recourse to income increasing 
accounting choices is stronger in menaced private firms that are family owned than in those 
that are not family owned.  
The secondary objective of our research is to investigate how EM priorities are 
affected by family involvement in the firms’ governance structure. Specifically, we 
investigate the effects of having a family member as a CEO and having independent members 
(i.e. non-family members) on the board.   
We use a unique database of family and non-family private firms that has recently 
become available from the Center for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at the 
Norwegian School of Management. The CCGR database contains financial and nonfinancial 
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data on limited liability companies in Norway.  For example, in addition to firm-specific 
financial statements data, the CCGR database contains detailed information about the identity 
of shareholders, board members, top executives, and their kinship and marriage. The family 
data in the database allows us to investigate the effects of family/non-family ownership (our 
primary objective) as well as governance factors such as family CEO and independent board 
(our secondary objective) on EM. 
We hypothesize and find that private family firms generally manage earnings 
downward compared with non-family private firms. However, under conditions of high 
leverage private family firms show stronger tendencies for income increasing EM than non- 
family private firms. Controlling for a number of variables such as firm age, size, growth, 
profitability and auditor type (Big-4/others), we also find that family CEOs are generally 
more loyal to family EM priorities than non-family CEOs and that independent boards to 
some extent mitigate EM in family firms. 
The study investigates a highly significant and yet under-researched segment of the 
economy. Specifically, the literature suggests that a majority of the companies in the global 
economy are private, of which many are family-controlled (Burkhart et al. 2003; La Porta et 
al. 1999; Colli 2003; Katz 2009). However, due primarily to the lack of reliable data in the 
past this segment of the economy has been under researched in the literature. We contribute 
to the literature by documenting differences in EM between family and non-family firms. We 
also contribute to the corporate governance literature by providing new insight into the role 
that family control and family involvement in the firm’s corporate governance structure play 
in financial reporting. Such knowledge is important for investors, tax authorities, creditors, 
and other stakeholders who rely on financial statements of private firms to make economic 
decisions. Academic researchers can also benefit from this knowledge as prior studies, 
especially those analyzing private firms, may suffer from omitted variable problems due to 
inadequate control of family ownership and family involvement. 
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The background literature leading to the study’s research hypotheses is presented in 
Section 2. We start by reviewing the literature on EM in order to sort out the motivations that 
may be relevant to EM by private family firms. We then describe the institutional setting of 
financial reporting of private companies in Norway. Lastly we look at the characteristics of 
family firms that may have an effect on their accounting choices. Section 3 presents the 
study’s research method, where the sample is identified and EM measures are specified, 
followed by specification of our regression models. Data analysis and results are presented in 
Section 4, followed by the final section on a summary and conclusions.  
2 Background and Hypotheses 
2.1 Empirical Findings of Earnings Management in Private Firms 
Most influential studies of EM have been conducted on U.S. listed companies (see 
Healy and Wahlen 1999; Fields et al. 2001 for reviews). However , there are some 
exceptions. A few works that scrutinize the reporting patterns of specific industries (Beatty 
and Harris 1998; Beatty et al. 2002; Beuselinck and Manigart 2007; Katz 2009) have small 
samples that include private (non-listed) firms. EM studies of private non-U.S. companies 
have also gradually become available. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) who investigate U.K. 
companies find private companies to have less timely loss recognition than public companies. 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) find private companies from 13 European Union (EU) countries to 
have more pervasive EM than public companies. Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) find 
EM tendencies of private firms to vary across countries, and Arnedo et al. (2007) report no 
more income smoothing in Spanish private companies than public firms.  
We add to this literature by investigating EM in family controlled private firms, an 
area of research almost entirely ignored in the extant literature.  In the next sections (2.2 and 
2.3) we first discuss various motivations and opportunities for EM in private firms in general. 
We then turn to the particular characteristics of family firms (Section 2.4). Based on the 
discussion in sections 2.2 – 2.4, we develop our hypotheses in Section 2.5..     
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2.2 Motivations for Earnings Management in Private Firms 
Reviews of prior literature (e.g., Healy and Wahlen 1999; Fields et al. 2001) 
commonly distinguish between capital markets, contracting, and regulatory motivations for 
EM. The capital markets motivation refers to the interest of the listed firms to influence their 
stock prices by their reported accounting information. Because stocks of private companies 
are not publically traded, the capital markets motivation is not a significant consideration for 
EM in private firms, unless they prepare for initial public offering. Hence, we disregard 
capital markets motivations in our study of family controlled private firms.  
Contracting motivations relate to the expected outcomes from contracts between 
companies and their contracting parties. For example, executive compensation contracts may 
result in EM by companies to maximize CEO remuneration (e.g. Healy 1985; Holthausen et 
al. 1995) when there is an explicit or implicit link between executive compensation and 
accounting numbers. Another contracting motivation is when a company manages its 
earnings so as to stay within the requirements of its debt covenants (Sweeney 1994).  
Contracting motivations encompass internal agency conflicts such as executive compensation 
and external agency conflicts such as obligations toward lenders or minority shareholders.  
These conflicts can occur in both listed and private companies. However, as discussed in 
Section 2.4 below, research indicates that agency conflicts may evolve differently in family 
and non-family firms. 
Regulatory motivations address EM in response to government regulation that is 
sensitive to reported accounting numbers. Examples include taxation, regulation of capital 
adequacy for banks and insurance companies, and fair competition legislation. In contrast to 
capital markets and contracting motivations, which are universal in nature, regulatory 
motivations have a distinct national flavor that depends on political priorities and 
consequential actions of various jurisdictions. For example, the magnitude of tax-motivated 
EM depends on the degree of book-tax conformity, which differs between countries. To the 
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extent that book and tax incomes are aligned, companies have an incentive to defer income 
recognition and advance expense recognition so as to minimize the present value of future 
taxes payable. Another important regulation is the limitation of dividend payout. For 
example, the 2nd EU Company Law Directive limits dividend distribution to the current and 
retained earnings. Thus, a dividend policy that is focused on maximizing the present value of 
future dividends to shareholders may trigger income increasing EM (Kasanen et al. 1996).  
Tax considerations are not likely to be significant for EM in countries with weak 
book-tax alignment. Our study uses data from Norway, a country where book-tax alignment 
is particularly weak (Nobes and Schwencke 2006). Nevertheless, a formal separation of tax 
and accounting rules may not be a sufficient condition for independence of tax and financial 
reporting. If the tax and accounting rules are separate but largely similar, substantial 
differences may undermine the credibility of either financial or tax income and increase the 
probability of a tax audit. Therefore, even in an environment of low book-tax alignment tax 
planning may be a reason for income-decreasing accounting choices. 
Similarly, the optimal accounting strategy for maximizing the value of the dividend 
stream in the presence of earnings-related limits on payouts to shareholders is not 
straightforward. An aggressive accounting policy that brings upfront the expected future 
value creation of the business so as to generate dividends early rather than late, may at first 
glance seem to serve the interests of the shareholders. However, to the extent that these 
accounting choices and dividend policies jeopardize the firm’s future prospects or reputation, 
or serve poorly the personal tax interests of the owners, this strategy may prove to be 
detrimental. An alternative strategy for a company may be to smooth the income stream 
distributed to its owners. Early studies of dividend-related smoothing have been reported in 
the U.S. context, where Graham and Dodd (1951) argued for investors’ preference for 
dividends, and Lintner (1956), based on interviews with corporate managers, proposed a 
dynamic model with partial adjustments to explain changes in the level of dividends. More 
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recently, Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) developed a theoretical framework of dividend 
smoothing that also incorporates smoothing of accounting income. Overall, this literature 
suggests that dividend policy may be a powerful motive for EM in both private and listed 
firms. 
In summary, private firms may have reasons to engage in EM as a response to agency 
conflicts and in order to ease the tax burden or facilitate a particular dividend pattern.  
2.3 Opportunities to Manage Earnings in Private Firms 
Financial reporting quality does not depend only on managers’ motivations, but also 
on the institutional setting and users’ requirements (Ball et al. 2000, Bushman and Piotroski 
2006). In Europe, limited liability companies are generally required  to prepare financial 
statements, irrespective of whether their securities are traded or not. Norwegian private 
companies are subject to the provisions of the 1998 Accounting Law and accounting 
standards issued by the Norwegian Accounting Standards Board (see Appendix A), whereas 
listed companies (which are not a part of this study) report under IFRS.
1
 In general, the 
Norwegian GAAP is considered to be less burdensome, but also less informative, than IFRS 
or U.S. GAAP, and it relies more extensively on broad principles. The accounting numbers 
have a direct impact on the flows between the company and its owners by the virtue of legal 
provisions that link the dividend potential to reported earnings (current or retained). A 
noteworthy difference between public and private firms’ financial reporting is that listed 
companies are subject to IFRS enforcement by a government supervisory body, whereas the 
only external control of private firms’ financial reporting is that carried out by their auditors. 
Thus, for accounting non-compliance the litigation risk in Norway is deemed low (Hope and 
Langli 2010). Flexible accounting standards, modest supervision and low litigation risk may 
provide ample opportunities for EM in Norway.   
                                                 
1
 Non-listed companies may opt for IFRS reporting, but so far they have not widely adopted this option.   
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Another noticeable national trait of the Norwegian accounting regulation is the degree 
of transparency of private firms’ financial reporting. All limited liability companies’ financial 
reports are mandatorily filed with a national financial statements registry from where they are 
accessible to the general public. The easy access to companies’ reports allows stakeholders 
(employees, contracting parties etc.) to use them at will.
2
  
Users’ needs for accounting information from private firms and listed firms are not 
identical, resulting in different EM opportunities for listed and private firms. Specifically, 
listed firms seek external financing in the capital and credit markets and in doing so they are 
compelled to satisfy investors’ and creditors’ demand for decision-useful information, such as 
reliable financial statements and earnings announcements. If the information quality is 
deemed unsatisfactory, investors and creditors will be reluctant to provide financing to the 
firm. This will in turn increase the firm’s cost of capital, to the detriment of its shareholders’ 
interest and most often also its management’s interest. From this perspective capital markets 
provide an effective monitoring of financial reporting quality of listed firms (Burgstahler et 
al., 2006).  
In comparison, private firms secure financing through contracting with private parties 
such as banks, to which they convey information through private channels (Petersen and 
Rajan 1994; Berger and Udell 1995). Private firms are more closely held and monitored by 
owners than listed companies, they often have owners as managers and board members, their 
lenders more often have direct access to the firm’s inside information and its decision-making 
processes, and there is no market in their residual equity instruments that can be actively 
misled by financial statement numbers. In short, the providers of capital do not depend on the 
statutory financial statements of private firms to the same extent as public firms, and hence 
do not as effectively oppose them from being managed. 
                                                 
2
 Detailed financial and non-financial information are available for all limited liability firms in Norway free of 
charge, see www.proff.no, www.1881.no, and www.purehelp.no. 
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In summary private firms have ample opportunities to manage earnings. These 
opportunities are at their highest in countries where local GAAP is more flexible than 
international GAAP (i.e., IFRS or U.S. GAAP) and the book/tax alignment is loose. For 
example, while financial statements of private companies are subject to audits and are 
publicly available in Norway, they nevertheless are less scrutinized by supervisors, analysts 
and the media than financial statements of listed firms. These conditions provide a 
particularly rich context to investigate EM priorities of private firms.  
2.4 Characteristics of Public and Private Family Firms 
Studies of family firms are primarily focused on their financial performance and 
organizational setup compared with non-family firms (e.g. Anderson and Reeb 2003, Beehr 
et al.1997; Daily and Dollinger 1992; McConaughy et al. 2001, Gomez-Mejia et al. 2001, 
Villalonga and Amit 2006, Chrisman et al. 2004). As pointed out by Dyer (2006), these 
studies vary significantly with respect to their definitions of family firms, performance 
criteria, sample criteria, and methodology. 
Only a few studies have investigated financial reporting patterns of family firms, and 
they are in the context of listed firms that have a significant portion of family ownership. For 
example, studying S&P 500 companies, Wang (2006) finds that family firms on average have 
higher earnings quality than non-family firms. Ali et al. (2007), also using S&P 500 
companies, report higher earnings quality in family firms than non-family firms, but family 
firms disclose less information than non-family firms (see also Chen et al. 2008; Anderson et 
al. 2009). Using a sample of Italian listed firms, Prencipe et al. (2008) find less income-
smoothing behavior but more EM related to debt contracts in family firms than in non-family 
firms. 
Our review of theory and research in the previous sections suggests that EM in private 
firms may result from contracting motivations (i.e. agency conflicts) as well as from 
regulatory motivations. Our objective is to identify differences in EM patterns between 
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private firms with and without family control. For this purpose contracting motivations are 
interesting because they are influenced by family firm characteristics. Regulatory motivations 
relating to tax or the ability to pay dividends are likely to influence the accounting choices of 
all sorts of private firms, but we do not expect those that are family controlled to have 
motivations that are fundamentally different from other private firms.  
A reason for variations in financial reporting quality between family and non-family 
firms may be that their agency conflicts are different.
3
 We use “ultimate ownership” for our 
definition of family ownership and define family control by the largest family owning a 
minimum of 50 percent of the firm.
4
 Consistent with the established agency theory we argue 
that the controlling family’s interest is likely to be aligned with that of the firm as a whole 
(Morck et al. 1988). Family firms often have a low level of internal agency conflict, because 
their managers tend to act in accordance with the interests of the controlling family owners 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976). The family effect is stronger when top management is recruited 
from the members of the controlling family. Ensley and Pearson (2005) show that 
management teams of family firms are more cohesive than those of non-family firms. Family 
ownership has the potential to generate a firm community with common goals, trust and 
values. 
However, unity and common goals may not always be the case in family firms. As 
Dyer (2006; 260) argues, family firms may be “the breeding grounds for relationships fraught 
with conflict.” Such conflicts typically emerge between the family members that exercise 
control on behalf of the family and the “passive” family shareholders, and they resemble the 
external conflicts that may arise relative to non-family stakeholders. The typical example of 
an external agency conflict is the controlling party’s tendency to expropriate benefits from 
                                                 
3
 Hope et al. (2010) analyze the relation between auditor effort and agency conflicts in private firms and 
document that the agency conflicts vary systematically with family involvement. 
4
 Wang (2006) defines family firm as one that either has a founding family member on the board or has some 
ownership by the founding family. We do not have information on founding families, and thus define family 
firm as a firm controlled by one family (i.e. owned by 50 % or more). See details in Section 3.2.  
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minority shareholders. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that large undiversified owners, 
such as founding family members, may forego maximum profits when they are unable to 
separate their own financial preferences from those of owners outside the family. Demsetz 
(1983) holds that family owners may choose non-pecuniary benefits at the expense of 
profitable projects. Such actions harm the interests of non-controlling shareholders. 
Internal and external agency conflicts are likely to generate different outcomes with 
respect to EM. A manager who is not fully trusted by the controlling shareholders but in 
charge of accounting choices may manage earnings upwards in order to embellish the true 
performance of the company. If the predictions of small internal agency conflicts in family 
firms are right, we may expect less EM of this kind in family firms compared with non-
family firms. Conversely, when there is a strong shareholder who seeks to squeeze a weaker 
one, it may be in the stronger party’s interest to conceal the true company financial 
performance in order to make it more difficult for the weaker party to claim its share. To the 
extent that such external agency conflicts are stronger in family firms than in non-family 
firms, we may expect more income-reducing EM in family firms. 
There are more family firm characteristics that potentially trigger EM. Becker (1974) 
argues that the principal governance objective of the controlling family is to maximize family 
income and consumption. However, although profitability may be an important goal in family 
businesses, it coexists with a desire to derive utility for the controlling owners independent of 
the financial flows, a phenomenon commonly referred to as family altruism or the “amenity 
potential” (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). An example of this is the pleasure that a company 
founder may derive from seeing the company run by one of his/her own children. When the 
amenity potential is sufficiently strong, it may incite the family owner to strive to maintain 
control, even at the expense of other objectives, such as profitability. A related phenomenon 
particular to family firms is that the family reputation may be associated with the conduct of 
the firm. For example, family firms may be used as a base for political influence. Both the 
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amenity and reputation arguments may foster strategies for the preservation of family control 
(Burkhart et al., 2003), frequently labeled the entrenchment effect.  
Another related feature is paternalism and “democratic capitalism” of family firms 
that are cornerstones of small local communities (Gulbrandsen 2005; Astrachan 1988). The 
entrepreneur family has a civic role in the community that goes beyond being a major 
employer and tax-payer. Examples include sponsoring local sports, religious and cultural 
activities, being a caretaker of the welfare of employees, and more generally sharing local 
values. In this role the family may prefer not to show off its wealth too openly because it 
might create an undesirable distance to the local community.  
In terms of EM, the entrenchment effect implies that family firms use accounting 
choices actively when it comes to defending the continued family control. Whenever the 
continued control is menaced, we expect family firms to undertake income-increasing 
measures. On the other hand, the paternalist role would rather indicate income-decreasing 
measures. The family would rather have large hidden reserves than high earnings and 
dividends. Notice that the two predicted strategies are contingent on the financial position of 
the family firm. 
2.5 Hypotheses   
The literature discussed above indicates tension in establishing hypotheses. For the 
reasons specified below we conjecture that private family firms are more eager than non-
family firms to understate true financial performance, or to avoid overstating it. First, the 
natural inclination for the family is to keep the wealth in the family and to curb distributions 
to non-family (external) stakeholders. This result can be more easily achieved when the 
reported financial performance is lower than the true performance. External stakeholders in 
this respect include minority shareholders, employees, suppliers, and others. Second, the 
internal agency conflicts between managers and shareholders are believed to be lower in 
family firms than in non-family firms. Hence, there may be a force for inflating income in 
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non-family firms that is mostly absent in family firms. Third, the paternalist argument, 
meaning that locally rooted family owners prefer not to show off too much of their wealth in 
public, supports the idea of income-reducing EM. Thus, our first hypothesis is: 
H1:  Private family firms manage earnings downward more extensively than 
private non-family firms. 
 
Amenity and entrenchment may result in a family firm avoiding situations where it is 
forced to dilute the shareholdings of the controlling family. A strategy for keeping family 
control is to establish and maintain a stable banking relationship or “relationship lending.” In 
this setting the principal bank gains an informational advantage over other lenders by the 
virtue of its insight into company’s transactions (cf., Fama 1985). There is evidence in the 
literature that relationship lending increases company value (James 1987; Petersen and Rajan 
1994), gives access to lower borrowing costs (Berger and Udell 1995), and facilitates credit 
extensions (Cole 1998). Relationship lending results in the bank receiving its desired 
information through private channels, thus there is no strong desire by the firm to publish 
detailed financial statements to the public.  
However, this relationship may not hold under adverse economic conditions. Like 
other companies, family firms are often subject to restrictive covenants in their borrowing 
agreements. These covenants frequently require key financial ratios to be held at certain 
limits. When these limits are violated, the owners’ continued control may be at risk, resulting 
in incentives to manage earnings. In family firms such behavior may be exacerbated by the 
entrenchment effect. Because more importance is attached to continued control in family 
firms than in other firms, we suggest that family firms will be more likely than other firms to 
exploit financial reporting flexibility upward in a situation where leverage is high. This 
argument suggests the following hypothesis.  
H2:  Leveraged private family firms use income increasing measures more 
extensively than other leveraged private firms. 
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Following Wang (2006) we include family CEO as a test variable. As explained in 
Section 2.4, agency problems between managers and owners are generally less of a concern 
in family firms than in non-family firms (Anderson and Reeb 2003). Cheng (2005) argues 
that the need for tying CEOs’ pay to earnings figure is low in family firms because the CEO 
is often a member of the family and his/her interests are aligned with the owners’ interests. 
However, although family firms often pick one of their own as CEO, they may hire non-
family members in top managerial positions when a qualified person is unavailable in family 
circles (Anderson and Reeb 2003). The typical executive compensation contract for a non-
family CEO often includes a bonus scheme relating to accounting numbers. Chrisman et al. 
(2007) provide exploratory evidence that non-family CEOs behave as agents that are 
motivated by incentive compensations.  We therefore conjecture that a family CEO tends to 
be more loyal to family priorities than a non-family CEO. Thus: 
H1A:  Family CEO reinforces income reducing tendencies of private family 
firms. 
 
H2A:  Family CEO reinforces income increasing tendencies of leveraged private 
family firms.   
 
Another test variable is the presence of non-family board members.  Family firms 
may have stronger need for advice from their boards than the monitoring function of the 
boards in non-family firms and listed companies. As Dalton et al. (1988) suggest, 
independent directors contribute expertise and objectivity that counterbalances managerial 
tendencies of entrenchment and expropriation. Independent board members generate critical 
assessments of firm projects and ask insiders the really difficult questions about firm 
activities (Winter 1977). Also, independent directors provide a line of defense for protecting 
the rights of non-controlling outside shareholders (Anderson and Reeb 2004). Finally, 
independent board members may have the ability to prevent the nomination of an unqualified 
family member as CEO (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).   
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The strong influences of independent board members suggest that their presence is 
positively associated with financial reporting quality. However, empirical research on the 
financial reporting quality effect of independent board members is mixed. Using data from 
Canada, Park and Shin (2004) find little evidence that presence of independent board 
members reduces discretionary accruals. Conversely, Peasnell et al. (2005) find evidence that 
outside directors on the board contribute to less EM in U.K. companies. We conjecture that 
outside board members have a crucial role to counterbalance unsound family governance in 
family firms, resulting in higher quality of earnings. Thus, we expect that: 
H1B:  Independent board members mitigate income reducing tendencies of 
private family firms. 
 
H2B:  Independent board members mitigate income increasing tendencies of 
leveraged private family firms. 
 
In addition to test variables, we control for variables that have been identified in prior 
research (e.g., Ashbaugh et al. 2003; Kothari et al. 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Dechow et 
al. 2008) to affect EM (see Section 3.2).  
3 Research Design 
3.1Choice of research design and dependent variable 
 We adopt the mainstream research design of EM studies by regressing a measure of 
discretionary accruals on a set of test and control variables. The dependent variable 
(discretionary accruals) is detailed in this section and the choice of test variables and control 
variables for the regression models is explained in Section 3.2. 
 We measure a company’s EM by the intensity of its use of discretionary accruals. 
Hence, large amounts of discretionary accruals indicate income increasing earnings 
management, and small (or negative) amounts indicate income decreasing earnings 
management. 
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Following Kothari et al. (2005) we measure discretionary accruals (DA) as the 
residual from the performance adjusted modified Jones model (all variables are defined in 
Exhibit 1):
5
  
 TACit /TAit-1 =    λ0 + α1(1/TAit-1) + λ 2(ΔSALESit - ΔRECit)/TAit-1  
   + λ 3PPEit/ TAit-1  +  λ 4ROAit  + it     (TAC) 
 
--Insert Exhibit 1 about Here-- 
 TAC is total accruals and TA is total assets. The reason for incorporating a constant 
term is that it provides an additional control for heteroskedasticity (beyond that provided by 
scaling with lagged total assets). Consistent with prior research that uses cross-sectional 
versions of discretionary accrual models (DeFond and Park 1997, Kothari et al., 2005), we 
subtract changes in accounts receivables (ΔREC) from changes in sales (ΔSALES) prior to 
estimating the model. Following Ashbaugh et al (2003) and Kothari et al. (2005) we add 
return on total assets (ROAit) to control movements in accruals related to normal 
performance. Performance adjustment is potentially important also because there might be 
differences between family and non-family firms in firm performance due to differences in 
agency cost and willingness to invest in (risky) projects that require new financing (Anderson 
and Reeb, 2003).
6
  
3.2 Regression Models 
We use the following basic model to test H1 (family firms manage earnings 
downwards more extensively than non-family firms): 
  
DAit =  0 + 1LFit + 2BIG4it + 3LEVit  + 4LNTAit + 5GROWTHit + 6LNAGEit + 
7CYCLEit + 8ROAit  + kINDUSTRYkit  + mYRmit + it   (1) 
    
 
                                                 
5
 The effects of using other models to estimate discretionary accruals are reported in the Additional Analysis 
Section. The model is estimated for subsets of industry-year samples that contain at least 50 observations. Firms 
in industries with less than 50 observations in any year are treated as a separate industry. 
6
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We regress the EM measure, DAit on the test variable LFit which indicates whether or 
not the firm is family controlled. We define LFit = 1 if firm i is owned by 50% or more by 
one single family in year t using information on the firm’s ultimate ownership, and 0 
otherwise. Persons who are related vertically through parents or grandparents (based on 
kinship or adoption), or persons married to any persons with such family relationship, are 
treated as one single family. Thus, horizontally our family definition includes nephews / 
nieces and their spouses. According to H1 (family firms decrease earnings more than non-
family firms) we expect α1 be negative.  
Based on previous research we include control variables that are known to correlate 
with discretionary accruals (referred to as CONTROLS in the equations below). Thus we 
control for auditor type (BIG4it), leverage (LEVit), firm size (LNTAit), profitability (ROAit), 
growth in sales (SALESit), length of the operating cycle (CYCLEit), and firm age (AGEit). 
BIG4it is an indicator variable for whether the firm is audited by one of the Big 4 auditor 
firms or not.  LEVit is the leverage ratio (debt to total assets). Firm size is measured as the 
natural log of the book values of total assets at the end of the fiscal year (LNTAit), 
profitability is the return on total assets (ROAit), growth (GROWTHit) is the annual growth 
rate in SALES, and operating cycle (CYCLEit) is the length of the firm’s operating cycle in 
days. Firm age (LNAGEit) is the natural log of the number of years from incorporation to year 
t. We include k-1 dummy variables for k industries to control for industry differences (each k 
representing one two-digit industry code). Finally, YRmit is an indicator variable that equals 1 
if observation of firm i is from year m, and 0 otherwise.   
Model (1ab) tests H1a (CEOs from the controlling family are more inclined to 
reinforce family firms’ income reducing tendencies than other CEOs) and H1b (independent 
board members mitigate the tendency to manage earnings downward): 
DAit =  0 + 1LFit + α2CEO_LFit + α3IB_LFit  + α4IBit + CONTROLSit + it (1ab) 
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 We define CEO_LFit = 1 if the CEO is related by kinship or marriage to the 
controlling family and 0 otherwise (i.e. when there is either no controlling family, or the CEO 
is not a member of the controlling family). According to H1a we expect α2 to be negative. The 
presence of non-family board members (IBit) in family-controlled firms is measured by 
IB_LFit which equals 1 if the firm is controlled by one family and the firm has at least one 
board member that is not related by kinship or marriage to the controlling family, 0 
otherwise. According to H1b we expect α3 to be positive.  
 Model 2 is used to test H2 (leveraged family firms use income increasing measures 
more extensively than non-family leveraged firms), while model 2ab is used to test H2a 
(family CEOs reinforces income increasing tendencies in leveraged family firms) and H2b 
(independent board members mitigate income increasing tendencies of leveraged family 
firms): 
 
DAit =  0 + 1LF_LEVit + α2LFit + CONTROLSit + it  (2) 
 
DAit =  0 + 1LF_LEVit + α2LFit + α3CEO_LF_LEVit + α4CEO_LFit + α5IB_LF_LEVit 
+ α6IB_LFit + α7IBit + CONTROLSit + it    (2ab) 
 
 
LF_LEVit is the test variable for H2, and it is defined by LF_LEVit = LFit * LEVit . It 
follows that LF_LEVit  equals 0 for all non-family firms. For family firm i it equals its 
leverage ratio. Consistent with hypothesis H2 we expect α1 of Model 2 to be positive, and 
according to H2a (H2b) we expect α3 (α5) of Model 2ab to be positive (negative). The control 
variables (CONTROLS) are identical with those of Models 1 and 1ab. 
4. Data Analysis and Results   
4.1 Source of Data  
 The source of data for our analysis is the new and unique CCGR database. For all 
limited liability firms in Norway, the CCGR database contains various financial and non-
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financial data, including very detailed information on CEOs, board members and owners (i.e., 
direct and ultimate ownership). In addition, all persons serving as CEOs, board members or 
owners are assigned to families based on proprietary information on kinship and marriage. 
(See Appendix B for details). CCGR has obtained special permission to gather and merge 
data from the Norwegian Data Inspectorate, an independent administrative body set up to 
ensure that private and public storage and use of data are in accordance with the Norwegian 
Personal Data Act. We gained access to the CCGR database through a special grant 
agreement.  
 Sample selection criteria and sample sizes are shown in Table 1. Specifically, there 
were 1,232,875 observations of limited liability companies in CCGR database for 2000-2007. 
Of these, 3,951 were excluded because they were public limited companies (including listed 
companies). We also excluded more than 830,000 observations because they related to very 
small companies (less than NOK 800,000, or approximately US$ 130,000, in operating 
revenue or total assets in at least one of the years under consideration). Other reasons for 
excluding observations were missing data on the company founding date, use of IFRS, 
reporting currency other than NOK, missing industry affiliation, and firm being in the 
financial industry. More than 80,000 observations were excluded because they related to 
subsidiaries or companies controlled by the government, and more than 40,000 observations 
were excluded because information on kinship and marriage of the relevant companies’ 
owners and CEOs was missing. As reported in Table 1 this screening resulted in a sample of 
215,349 company-years for tests of our hypotheses.  
-- Insert Table 1 about here – 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on dependent and independent variables for all 
firms (Panel 1), by type of ownership (non-family firms in Panel 2 and family firms in Panel 
3) and tests for significant differences between non-family and family firms (Panel 4).  
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-- Insert Table 2 about here -- 
Table 2 reveals distinct differences between family and non-family firms. All the test 
and control variables are significantly different. The only variable that is not significantly 
different between the two groups is the discretionary accruals (DA). Family firms are older, 
have longer operating cycles, slower growth, and they have higher leverage and return on 
assets ratios than non-family firms. In addition, they less often have independent board 
members and Big 4 auditors.  
Table 3 presents Spearman correlation coefficients between dependent variables, test 
variables and selected control variables. As expected, correlations between original variables 
and their interaction variables are highly significant.
7
 
-- Insert Table 3 about here -- 
4.3 Multivariate Tests 
 Table 4 presents the results of the OLS regressions used to test the hypotheses. Our 
focus in Model 1 is on the coefficient of the family firm variable, LF. The coefficient is 
negative and significant at the .01 level, providing statistical support for H1. It indicates that 
family firms tend to use discretionary variables so as to decrease earnings. The control 
variables are also mostly significant (across all models), and in line with results from prior 
research. Specifically, high leverage goes together with income increasing accruals, and Big 
4 auditor helps to keep them down. Larger firms use less income increasing accruals than 
smaller, whereas profitable firms (measured by ROA) actively boost earnings. 
-- Insert Table 4 about here -- 
                                                 
7
 High correlation coefficients (above 0.77) exist between LEV and LF_LEV and between LF_LEV and 
CEO_LF_LEV. Thus, multicolinearity is a potential source of concern. All regressions have been tested for 
multicolinearity. Most sever multicolinarity is found in model 2ab in Table 4 with a variance inflation factor 
(VIF) of 10.8 for LF_LEV, which exceeds the critical value of 10 as recommended by Lardaro (1993). 
Estimating the model without LF_LEV (which is insignificant in Table 4) yields identical results for the 
variables remaining in the model and the VIF's are well below the critical value of 10.Thus we conclude that 
multicolinearity is not a major concern in our study.  
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Model 1ab tests the roles of the family CEO and the independent board members of 
family firms. Our focus is the coefficient of CEO_LF, which we expect to be negative since 
the family CEO may help the family carrying out its EM strategy. We expect the coefficient 
of IB_LF to be positive since independent board members may mitigate the EM tendencies of 
the controlling family. Table 4 indicates mixed support for these hypotheses. Specifically, 
when additional test variables are included, the family firm variable becomes insignificant. 
Furthermore, while we find a negative coefficient for CEO_LF as predicted by H1a, the 
coefficient is significant at a marginal level (p-value of 0.103 using two-sided tests). When it 
comes to independent board members, they generally contribute to increase earnings, as 
evidenced by the highly significant IB coefficient. However, the separate incremental effect 
of the independent board member in family firms is negative and significant at the .05 level, 
which is opposite of our prediction (H1b).
8
  
Model 2 shows whether family firms with high leverage use income increasing 
measures more extensively than non-family firms (H2). As expected, we find a highly 
significant positive coefficient for the variable LEV, which suggests that all leveraged 
companies tend to inflate earnings. Our test variable is leverage interacted with the family 
variable (LF_LEV). The coefficient of this variable is positive and highly significant, 
indicating that leveraged family firms more actively manage earnings upward than non-
family firms. We note in Model 2 that the coefficient of LF remains negative and strongly 
significant. Thus, Model 2 confirms the existence of two opposite EM tendencies in family 
firms relative to non-family firms: They are income decreasing in normal circumstances, but 
income increasing when highly leveraged. 
Model 2ab adds variables that test H2a and H2b. We find support that the family CEO 
reinforces the use of income increasing accounting choices in leveraged family firms (H2a), 
                                                 
8
 We report the results of an alternative definition of independent board members in the Additional Analysis 
section.  
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and that independent board members attenuate these tendencies (H2b). However, when these 
variables are included in the regression model, the coefficient of LF_LEV becomes 
insignificant. A possible interpretation of this result is that the incremental EM in leveraged 
family firms only takes place when there is a family CEO at the helm. 
Model 2ab produces results indicating that the CEO_LF variable has a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient, which is expected when H1a is true. Thus Model 2ab 
provides stronger support for H1a than Model 1ab. An interpretation of this result is that 
Model 1ab does not adequately control for the fact that the EM priorities of these firms are 
strongly opposite depending on their leverage ratio. The coefficients of CEO_LF and 
CEO_LF_LEV in Model 2ab strongly indicates that family CEOs most often help family 
firms to conceal earnings, but they also help family owners boost their firms’ earnings when 
financial conditions are strained (i.e., leveraged). Hence, in Model 2ab we find support for 
both H1a and H2a. 
Insufficient control for the effect of leverage in family firms may also explain why, 
contrary to our predictions, the coefficient of IB_LF is significant and negative in Model 1ab. 
Model 2ab results show that independent board members counter the income-increasing 
tendencies of family firms when leverage is high. In other circumstances the independent 
board member has no effect on EM in family firms (see the insignificant coefficient of 
variable IB_LF in Model 2ab) . Hence, we find no support for H1b but we find strong support 
for H2b. 
4.4 Additional Analyses  
 In this section we report the results from various sensitivity and robustness tests.
9
 
First, we repeated all tests using percentage ownership of the largest family owner instead of 
the binary measure (50% ownership or more versus less than 50 %) used in the initial 
analyses. The results from estimating Model 1 and Model 2ab are identical to those reported 
                                                 
9
 All supplemental tests are untabulated. Results are available from authors upon request. 
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above. For the other models, we find the same effect for CEO_LF and IB_LF, but LF_LEV 
becomes insignificant.  
To assess the sensitivity of the results to the different methods of measuring 
discretionary accruals, we repeated all tests using the original cross sectional modified Jones 
model as proposed by Dechow et al (1995) and the modified Jones model as implemented by 
Kothari et al. (2005). The results for Model 1 and Model 2ab were identical to those reported 
earlier. For the other models the original modified cross sectional Jones model produced 
similar results to those that are tabulated with one exception: LF_LEV becomes insignificant. 
For the Kothari et al. (2005) version of the cross-sectional modified Jones, CEO_LF becomes 
statistically significant while the results for other variables stay the same as those reported 
earlier.   
H1b predicts that independent board members moderate EM in family firms. However, 
the results reported are mixed, as discussed in the previous subsection. In the principal tests 
IB is defined as being equal to 1 if there is at least one non-family member on the board, 0 
otherwise. We tested our models for an alternative definition of independent board, where IB 
is equal to 1 if a majority of the board members is independent of the largest family, 0 
otherwise. Defined this way, IB indicates a state in which the controlling family has 
surrendered the control over board decisions to non-family members. However, this 
alternative definition of independent board members did not change any of the results 
reported earlier. 
All regression models results reported in Table 4 produce highly significant and 
negative coefficients for the BIG4 variable, which indicates that companies with a Big 4 
auditor have smaller discretionary accruals (less income increasing) than companies with 
other auditors. We did not include the use of Big 4 auditor in our hypotheses, because we had 
no reason to believe that it would work differently in family and non-family firms. We have 
nevertheless tested whether interacting BIG4 with LF or LF_LEV would produce significant 
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coefficients or influence other test variable coefficients significantly. We did not find any 
evidence of such effects. Thus, we conclude that Big 4 auditors have positive governance 
effects for both family and non-family firms.    
Table 3 reveals that all test variables are correlated with firm size. To assess the 
importance of size we (1) added squared total assets (LNTA * LNTA) to the models, (2) 
replaced LNTA with LNSALES (natural log of SALES), and (3) estimated the models on 
subsets of firms consisting of 75 % of the largest (smallest) firms measured by SALES or TA, 
respectively. The family variable (LF) became significantly negative in Model 2ab when 25 
% of the largest firms were removed. Otherwise all results are identical to those we reported 
earlier.    
Overall the results from various sensitivity tests provide no significant threats to the 
main findings reported earlier.  
5.  Summary and Conclusions 
 Extensive research treats how and why public listed firms engage in EM. In 
comparison, very little is known about EM by private (unlisted) firms. Because private 
companies are not as much influenced by global trends and regulations as are public 
companies, there may be more variation in accounting choices in private firms than public 
firms. Our contribution to the literature is to fit one more piece into the larger jigsaw puzzle 
of financial reporting tendencies of private firms. 
 We ask whether family-controlled firms within the group of private firms make 
different accounting choices than non-family firms, and whether such differences are likely to 
be caused by EM. Our research design is tailored to reflect acquired theoretical knowledge 
both about private firms (as compared with public firms) and about family firms (as 
compared with non-family firms). We argue that private family firms distinguish themselves 
from other private firms by their priority for sustaining family consumption, together with 
family altruism and entrenchment. Taken together we hypothesize and find evidence of 
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certain EM tendencies of private family firms. Specifically, we find that relative to non-
family firms, private family firms manage earnings downward in most circumstances. 
However, under financial stress they manage earnings upward.  Thus, we observe two 
opposite tendencies of EM contingent on the financial situation in private family firms, 
We test whether the tendencies for EM in private family firms are different if the CEO 
is a member of the controlling family or if the company has board members that are 
independent of the family. Based on prior family firm research we hypothesize that a family 
CEO will contribute positively to the EM tendencies that are in the interest of the family, 
whereas independent board members mitigate these tendencies. These additional hypotheses 
also receive support, but only when we adequately control for the fact that the EM tendencies 
in these firms are subject to two opposite forces.  
Our research has implications for stakeholders who rely on the financial statements of 
private firms (family or non-family) for their economic decisions. Financial statement users 
should beware of the inaccuracies and biases that EM tendencies of private family firms may 
imply. Moreover, our findings shed new light on corporate governance structures of private 
family firms, especially with respect to the roles of a family CEO and independent board 
members. Finally, our research could be useful for regulators who decide the form and 
content of financial reporting by private firms. 
Our study is based on a database of private Norwegian firms which recently has been 
established by the Center for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at the Norwegian 
School of Management. The CCGR database is unique in its combining financial data with 
personal data on managers, owners and board members. We note that flexible accounting 
standards, modest supervision, low book-tax conformity and low litigation risk in Norway 
present a fertile environment to investigate EM by various companies, including private 
family and non-family firms. While the results of our study may be gneralizeable to other 
countries with similar financial reporting environments, the results from countries with more 
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stringent reporting requirements, more book-tax conformity and higher litigation risks may be 
different.  Thus, extensions of our study to other countries can be a fruitful avenue for future 
research. 
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Appendix A 
 
The Norwegian Accounting Regulatory System 
 
Norwegian companies are subject to the accounting requirements of the 1998 
Accounting Law, which implements the EU 4
th
 Directive in Norwegian legislation. The law 
governs all companies with limited liability (public or private), as well as public sector 
companies, mutual institutions, companies with unlimited liability, associations with profit-
making purposes, and all other economic entities that exceed certain size limits. The law 
requires all subjects to issue consolidated accounts for groups and separate accounts for legal 
entities. Consistent with the EU 2002 IAS Regulation, listed companies are subject to a 
special section of the law that mandates the use of International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) for their consolidated accounts. The law contains recognition and 
measurement rules which constitute the basis for the Norwegian GAAP (N GAAP), to be 
followed by all the other subjects of the law (including, for their separate company accounts, 
the parent companies of IFRS reporting groups). 
The law has its origins in Continental Europe company legislation, and the Norwegian 
regulation therefore qualifies as a code law (as compared with common law) accounting 
regime. Nevertheless, the substantive part of the accounting rules is formulated in accounting 
standards, issued by a private standard setter, the Norwegian Accounting Standards Board 
(NASB), founded in 1989. The content of the standards has since the start of the NASB been 
very much influenced by US GAAP and IFRS. Currently, the NASB’s objective is to issue 
standards that resemble the IFRS while allowing for some simplification, subject to the 
requirements given by the Accounting Law.
10
 Substantial divergence between IFRS and N 
GAAP with respect to recognition and measurement rules are few. The most notable 
                                                 
10
 All documents regarding the NASB, including the accounting standards, are available on its website, 
www.regnskapsstiftelsen.no in Norwegian language. The NASB’s objectives are formulated in a “strategy 
document”, which was last issued in 2008.  
28 
 
differences are measurement at cost in some circumstances where IFRS require fair value (for 
non-listed financial instruments, investment property and biological assets) and more 
traditional goodwill accounting. 
All enterprises subject to the law are allowed to issue IFRS financial statements 
instead of N GAAP financial statements. In practice this option is used only by entities 
belonging to IFRS-reporting groups or by financial institutions.  
All financial statements of companies with limited liability are subject to audit 
requirements, which effectively enforce the adherence to the accounting rules. Some 
enforcement of the accounting rules is also exercised by tax authorities, although book-tax 
alignment is weaker in Norway than in most code-law countries. The law contains severe 
penal provisions for violations (fines and up to six years of imprisonment). 
All financial statements governed by the law are publicly available in the sense that 
anyone has the right to receive them at the company’s registered office. In practice, the public 
availability of financial statements is effective for companies with limited liability because 
they must file their annual reports with the National Financial Statements Registry (NFSR). 
Specialized reports are available on the Internet through private websites that specialize in 
various types of corporate information (including credit ratings). 
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Appendix B 
 
The CCGR Database 
 
The Center for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) has permission to aggregate 
data from two sources: Experian AS and the National Register Office (NRO). Experian AS 
provides information from financial statements and other firm-specific information such as 
industry affiliation and the firms’ auditors. NRO provides information on kinship and 
marriage for all persons identified as CEOs, board members or owners.  
 The CCGR database is unique because Norway has a universal financial reporting 
requirement for limited liability companies (see Appendix A). There are no size limits as to 
which firms must disclose audited financial statements, and there are detailed requirements as 
to what kind of information must be disclosed in the notes. Thus, detailed audited information 
is available for all limited liability companies. For firms that do not qualify as a small 
enterprise information of its 20 largest shareholders and their shareholdings must be disclosed 
in the notes as long as the individual shareholdings exceed 1%. For firms that qualify as a 
small enterprise the notes must contain information on its 10 largest shareholders as long as 
the shareholder owns 5% or more. In addition, names and shareholdings of all CEOs and 
members of the Board must be disclosed. CCGR has merged social security numbers for each 
CEO, board members and personal owners with information on kinship and marriage from 
the NRO. CEOs, board members and owners are grouped into the same family if they are 
related by kinship or adoption as parents, grandparents, great-grandparents, great-great-
grandparents, sisters, cousins, uncles/aunts, and nephews/nieces or married to any of these 
persons are assigned to the same family.  
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Exhibit 1: Variable Definitions in alphabetical order  
BIG4it  = 1 if the firm is audited by one of the Big-4 auditors (or their forerunners) in year 
t, 0 otherwise. 
CEO_LFit   = 1 if 50 % or more is owned by one family (i.e. LFi = 1) and the same family 
holds the CEO in year t, 0 otherwise.  
CEO_LF_LEVit  
 
= The leverage ratio for firms controlled by one family with at least 50% 
ownership that also holds the CEO position in year t, 0 otherwise. 
CEO_LF_LEVit = CEO_LFit * LEVit. 
CYCLEit  = Operating cycle in days for firm i in year t = (yearly average accounts 
receivable) / (SALES / 360 ) + (yearly average inventory) / (acquisition costs of 
goods sold in year t/360). 
DAit  = Discretionary accruals of firm i in year t. Measures firm i's income increasing 
accounting choices in year t. DAit is estimated as the residual from equation 
(TAC) described in text.  
GROWTHit  = Growth in sales for firm i in year t computed as (SALESit/SALESit-1 - 1). 
IB_LF_LEVit    = The leverage ratio for firms that are controlled by one family and have at least 
one non-largest family member on the board in year t, 0 otherwise. 
IB_LF_LEVit = IB_LFit * LEVit. 
IB_LFit  = IBit * LFit = 1 if largest family owns 50 % in year t and the firm has at least one 
independent board member in year t, 0 otherwise. 
IBit  = 1 if firm i has at least one independent board member in year t, 0 otherwise. 
Board members are defined as independent if they are not related to the CEO or 
owners by kinship or marriage.  
INDUSTRYkit = Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i belongs to industry k, 0 otherwise, k is 
defined using 's industry affiliation in year t using two-digits NACE industry 
classification in accordance with Statistical Classification of Economic Activity 
in the European Community (NACE) codes..  
LEVit = Leverage ratio for firm i in year t computed as interest bearing debt to total 
assets, both measured at the end of year t.  
LF_LEVit  = Leverage ratio for family controlled firm in year t =  LFit * LEVit. 
LFit  = 1 if 50% or more of firm i is owned by one family in year t using ultimate 
ownership, 0 otherwise.  
LNAGEi  = Firm i's age in years at the end of the sample period computed as the natural log 
of age. 
LNTAit  = Size of firm i in year t computed as the natural log of total assets for firm i at the 
end of year t. 
PPEit = Gross property, plant and equipment for firm i at the end of fiscal year t  
ROAit  = Return on total assets for firm i in year t = net income before interest, taxes and 
extraordinary items scaled by average total assets. 
TACit  = Total accruals for firm i in year t =  (∆Current assets - ∆Cash) - (∆Current 
liabilities - ∆Short term debt - ∆Proposed dividends) - ∆Depreciation and 
impairments - ∆Net deferred tax assets). 11 
TAit-1  = Total assets at fiscal year end for firm i in year t-1  
YRm = 1 if observations is from year m, 0 otherwise (m = 2000, 2001, …, 2007) 
ΔRECit = Net accounts receivables for firm i in year t less net accounts receivables in year 
t-1 
ΔSALESit = Total revenues firm i in year t less total revenues in year t-1  
 
                                                 
11
The vast majority of private public liability firms in Norway are not required to publish cash flow statements. 
Thus, consistent with the literature we rely on the balance sheet to estimate total accruals (TAC) and cash flows 
from operations (Burgstahler et al., 2006). Changes in proposed dividends are subtracted from short term 
liabilities since proposed dividends may be classified as short term debt in Norway.  
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Table 1: Sample Selection Criteria and Sample Size.  
Sample selection criteria  Firm-years 
Limited liability companies 2000-2007 1,232,878 
Exclusion criteria 
 Public limited liability companies (including listed) 3,951
Operating revenue less than 800,000 NOK in at least one year  715,255 
Total assets less than 800,000 NOK in at least one year 116,933 
Missing information on founding date, firm using IFRS or reporting currency not NOK 45,600 
Missing information on industry affiliation or firm is a financial firm 2,866 
Subsidiaries 86,560 
Firms with missing information on kinship and marriage 46,061 
Firms controlled by the government  303 
Number of firm-years  215,349 
This table shows sample size criteria and the resulting sample size. The number of observations per 
year varies between 24,770 and 28,892. 
 
 
 Table 2: Descriptive statistics. 
  Panel 1: All firms (N=215,349)   Panel 2: Non-family (N=43,115)   Panel 3: Family (N=172,234)   Panel B: Test for differences: 
  Mean St.dev Median   Mean St.dev. Median   Mean St.dev. Median   T-value Z-value 
DA 0.000 0.186 0.004 
 
0.001 0.192 0.004 
 
0.000 0.185 0.004 
 
0.96 
 
-0.09 
 LF_LEV 0.217 0.264 0.098
 
0 0 0
 
0.272 0.270 0.208
   CEO_LF_LEV 0.169 0.248 0
 
0 0 0
 
0.211 0.260 0.087
   IB_LF_LEV 0.075 0.187 0
 
0 0 0
 
0.093 0 0
   LF 0.800 0.400 1
 
0 0 0
 
1 0 1
     LEV 0.267 0.270 0.1978
 
0.247 0.271 0
 
0.272 0.270 0.208
 
-17.13*** -20.25*** 
CEO_LF 0.628 0.483 1
 
0 0 0
 
0.785 0.411 1
   IB 0.375 0.484 0
 
0.550 0.498 1
 
0.331 0.471 0
 
85.4*** 83.99*** 
IB_LF 0.265 0.441 0
 
0 0 0
 
0.331 0.471 0
   BIG4 0.203 0.403 0
 
0.260 0.439 0
 
0.189 0.392 0
 
32.70*** 32.62*** 
LNTA 8.549 1.184 8.326
 
8.938 1.326 8.713
 
8.451 1.125 8.240
 
77.53 *** 74.09 *** 
GROWTH 0.094 0.300 0.049
 
0.121 0.335 0.063
 
0.087 0.291 0.046
 
21.35 *** 19.12 *** 
LNAGE 2.473 0.734 2.565
 
2.411 0.772 2.398
 
2.488 0.723 2.565
 
-19.52 *** -24.32 *** 
CYCLE 81.9 90.4 51.1
 
73.2 87.4 43.8
 
84.0 91.1 53.1
 
-22.31 *** -27.76 *** 
ROA 0.151 0.180 0.121  0.143 0.190 0.112  0.153 0.177 0.123  -10.10 *** -12.15 *** 
This table reports in descriptive statistics for all firms (Panel 1), non-family firms only (Panel 2), family firms only (Panel 3) and t-tests (Wilcoxon rang sum 
tests) for differences in mean (median) between non-family and family firms (Panel 4). Tests for significant differences between the two subsets are not 
performed for variables that by construction have zeros for non-family firms. * (**) [***] denotes significant test statistics at the 0.10 (0.05) [0.01] level (two-
sided tests). The variables LEV and CYCLE have been winsorized at 99-percentile, and GROWTH and ROA have been winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile. 
Please see Exhibit 1 for variable definitions.  
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Table 3: Spearman Correlation Coefficients Between Dependent Variable, Test Variables and Selected Control Variables. 
  DA   LF   LEV   LF_LEV   CEO_LF_LEV IB_LF_LEV GROWTH   LNAGE   
LF 0.000                            
 LEV 0.117 * 0.044 * 
            LF_LEV 0.089 * 0.530 * 0.777 * 
          CEO_LF_LEV 0.067 * 0.436 * 0.585 * 0.778 * 
        IB_LF_LEV 0.026 * 0.249 * 0.285 * 0.404 * 0.283 * 
      LNTA 0.000  -0.160 * 0.199 * 0.072 * 0.011 * 0.101 * 
    GROWTH -0.005 # -0.041 * -0.040 * -0.041 * -0.030 * -0.005 * 0.099 * 
  LNAGE 0.009 * 0.052 * -0.016 * 0.015 * 0.027 * 0.000 * 0.227 * -0.100 * 
This table shows Spearman correlation coefficients between DA, discretionary accruals estimated using the TAC-model as described in text, and test and 
selected control variables used in Table 4. N=215,349. * (#) [§] denotes level of significance at the 0.01 (0.05) [0.10] level. Please see Exhibit 1 for variables 
definitions. 
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Table 4: OLS Regression Results of Differential Income Increasing Accounting Choices Between 
Family and Non-Family firms. 
 
 Pred. sign Model 1   Model 1ab   Model 2   Model 2ab 
LF - -0.005 *** 
 
-0.002 
  
-0.007 *** 
 
-0.002 
 
 
 (-5.34) 
  
(-1.03) 
  
(-4.86) 
  
(-1.01) 
 CEO_LF - 
  
-0.002 
    
-0.004 *** 
 
 
  
(-1.63) 
    
(-2.84) 
 IB_LF + 
  
-0.004 ** 
   
-0.002 
 
 
 
  
(-2.15) 
    
(-1.01) 
 LF_LEV + 
    
0.007 ** 
 
0.003 
 
 
 
    
(1.97) 
  
(0.56) 
 CEO_LF_LEV + 
      
0.010 ** 
 
 
      
(2.52) 
 IB_LF_LEV - 
      
-0.008 ** 
 
 
      
(-2.25) 
 IB  
  
0.005 *** 
 
0.002 ** 
 
0.005 *** 
 
 
  
(2.74) 
  
(2.01) 
  
(2.81) 
 LEV  0.112 *** 
 
0.112 *** 
 
0.106 *** 
 
0.106 *** 
 
 (62.95) 
  
(62.98) 
  
(30.29) 
  
(30.20) 
 BIG4  -0.003 *** 
 
-0.003 *** 
 
-0.003 *** 
 
-0.003 *** 
 
 (-3.73) 
  
(-3.82) 
  
(-3.78) 
  
(-3.79) 
 LNTA  -0.002 *** 
 
-0.002 *** 
 
-0.002 *** 
 
-0.002 *** 
 
 (-5.08) 
  
(-5.36) 
  
(-5.27) 
  
(-5.29) 
 GROWTH  0.004 * 
 
0.004 * 
 
0.004 * 
 
0.004 * 
 
 (1.93) 
  
(1.90) 
  
(1.91) 
  
(1.88) 
 LNAGE  0.003 *** 
 
0.004 *** 
 
0.004 *** 
 
0.003 *** 
 
 (6.49) 
  
(6.54) 
  
(6.52) 
  
(6.43) 
 CYCLE  0.000 *** 
 
0.000 *** 
 
0.000 *** 
 
0.000 *** 
 
 (20.21) 
  
(20.21) 
  
(20.17) 
  
(20.12) 
 ROA  0.065 *** 
 
0.065 *** 
 
0.065 *** 
 
0.065 *** 
 
 (19.36) 
  
(19.46) 
  
(19.41) 
  
(19.45) 
 CONSTANT  -0.038 *** 
 
-0.039 *** 
 
-0.037 *** 
 
-0.038 *** 
 
 (-7.49) 
  
(-7.68) 
  
(-7.13) 
  
(-7.36) 
 Industry fixed effects  Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 Year fixed effects  Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 N  215349 
  
215349 
  
215349 
  
215349 
 Adjusted R
2
   0.022    0.022    0.022    0.022  
This table reports ordinary least squares (OLS) estimated coefficients and corresponding t-values (in 
parenthesis) for models specified in text. The dependent variable is discretionary accruals (DA, estimated 
by equation TAC in text). Reported significance levels (*, **, and *** for 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, 
respectively) are for two-sided tests and based on Huber-White standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
Please see Exhibit 1 for variable definitions.  
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